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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is widely acknowledged that predatory pricing may cause injury to competition and this
practice generally constitutes a violation of competition laws, especially when it drives out
rivals or impedes entry of new ﬁrms. In particular, this is the case when predatory pricing
occurs in intermediate goods markets (section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act). Predatory
pricing can be established when there is below-cost pricing still with possible recoupment of
losses after the predator has driven its rivals out of the market. However, recent economic
analysis oﬀer a contrasted view on the impact of predatory pricing on the industry structure
as well as on the welfare. Marx and Shaﬀer (1999) show that below cost pricing without
exclusion of rivals may occur in intermediate goods market and may be welfare improving.
They coined the term “predatory accommodation” for this kind of situation. They focus on
pricing when a monopolist retailer negotiates two-parts tariﬀs sequentially with two suppliers
of imperfect substitutes. It is shown that the retailer and the ﬁrst manufacturer which
negotiates jointly ﬁnd proﬁtable to establish the wholesale price under (constant) marginal
cost in order to extract surplus from the second manufacturer.1 Intuitively, when the retailer
negotiates with the second manufacturer, the retailer’s disagreement payoﬀ is decreasing in
t h ep r i c ea tw h i c hi tc a nb u yadditional units from the ﬁrst manufacturer. So, by decreasing
this price, the retailer and the ﬁrst manufacturer jointly increase the size of concessions
the second manufacturer must make. However, below-cost pricing does not drive the second
manufacturer out of the market. On the contrary, both the retailer and the ﬁrst manufacturer
beneﬁt from its presence by jointly extracting partly its surplus through below-cost pricing
as a rent-shifting mechanism.
However, it is clear that their result relies heavily on the sequential nature of the timing
and thus the observability of contracts, as acknowledged by the authors. Indeed, Shaﬀer
(2001) shows that when bilateral bargaining are simultaneous then overall joint proﬁti s
1The contracts depends only on the quantity purchased from a single supplier, so that exclusive dealing
provisions such as in Aghion and Bolton’s (1987) analysis are excluded.
2maximized in any bargaining equilibrium and that marginal cost pricing prevails with two-
parts tariﬀs. Thus, predatory accommodation is valid only for sequential timings.
In this paper, we provide a new explanation for predatory accommodation but in a frame-
work with simultaneous bilateral bargaining. Our point relies on incorporating into the analy-
sis the strategic interactions between manufacturers on the upstream market which provides
the necessary inputs for production. More precisely, we consider a channel structure in which
an upstream sector sells a homogenous raw product to a processing industry composed of
n ≥ 2 manufacturers. The manufacturers subsequently process and sell a ﬁnal diﬀerentiated
commodity to a downstream retailer acting as a monopoly. We assume a perfectly compet-
itive upstream sector while market power is present at both the manufacturers and retail
levels. Thus, manufacturers act both as an oligopsony when buying raw material and as an
oligopoly when selling their products to the retailer. Similarly, the multi-products retailer
acts both as a monopsony when negotiating with manufacturers and as a monopoly with re-
spect to ﬁnal consumers. The assumption of a monopolist retailer allows for a simple analysis
while enabling to introduce market power at the retail level.
It is worth noting that empirically this framework is broadly consistent with available
studies of market structure in the food industry sector both in the US and in Europe. Food
processing industries often comprise few processors who purchase a raw farm product from
many producers and process it into ﬁnal products, possibly diﬀerentiated (Sexton and Lavoie
(2002)). The literature posits an oligopsonistic relationship in markets where farm product
producers meet with food processors and emphasizes that such an industry structure may
result in imperfect competition on both the buying and selling sides of the market, which
aﬀects the surplus of both farmers and consumers (see e.g. Chen and Lent (1992), Wann and
Sexton (1992), Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997), Hamilton and Sunding (1998) and Hamilton
(2002)). However, this literature has relatively neglected the existence and the importance
of market power at the retail level. One key feature of our paper is to focus on market power
both at the processing and retail levels.
3We show that the presence of the oligopsonistic behavior on the upstream market induces
a negative cost externality between manufacturers through quantities exchanged. We then
characterize the optimal two-parts tariﬀ for each bilateral bargaining between a manufacturer
and the retailer. We show that wholesale price diﬀers from the marginal processing cost
depending on ﬁnal demand characteristics and the intensity of oligopsonistic behavior on
the upstream farm market. In particular, in the important case of imperfect substitution
between ﬁnal diﬀerentiated products, we ﬁnd that wholesale price is always below marginal
cost. We even prove that below average cost pricing may occur when the degree of products
diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently small. Intuitively, in presence of cost externalities and imperfect
substitutes, each negotiated contract takes partially into account the negative eﬀect of the
quantities sold by the rival manufacturers’ on the procurement cost. Indeed, for a given
manufacturer, decreasing the wholesale price amounts to decrease the rivals’ quantities sold
by the retailer, which in turn lowers its own procurement cost by reducing cost externalities.
Thus, the perceived marginal cost is lower than marginal cost. This strategic “reducing its own
cost” eﬀe c ti sm o r ec o m p e l l i n gw h e nﬁnal products are less diﬀerentiated, ceteris paribus.O n
the contrary, in the particular case where ﬁnal demands for both products are independent,
cost externalities are irrelevant for the wholesale pricing rule and marginal cost pricing occurs.
Of course, the motivation for having below marginal cost pricing is very diﬀerent from the
“rent-shifting” motivation that occurs in Marx and Shaﬀer’s analysis. Nevertheless, in our
context, the properties of the equilibrium are similar: below cost pricing without exclusion
of rivals.
We also characterize the optimal fees or slotting allowances paid by manufacturers to the
retailer and we show that the sign of these transfers is generally ambiguous and depends on the
gap between wholesale price and average cost, on the bargaining power of the manufacturer
under scrutiny and on a scale eﬀect that we identify. Moreover, we show that the presence
of cost externalities impedes the maximization of joint proﬁt in the simultaneous bargaining
process in the channel. Thus, our ﬁnding indicates that the form of contracts plays a role in
4the degree of ineﬃciency in the channel.
Welfare analysis surprisingly shows that below cost pricing may be welfare improving as
it causes consumer surplus and upstream producers surplus to increase. This increase can
outweigh the reduction in joint proﬁt of the industry (manufacturers and the retailer) due to
the downward distortion on wholesale prices.
We then turn to the sequential case, restricting the analysis to two manufacturers inter-
acting with the retailer. We show how Marx and Shaﬀer’s results should be altered. We
state that the wholesale price for the ﬁrst manufacturer which enters into negotiation may
be or not under marginal cost, contrary to the case under simultaneous bilateral bargaining.
Actually, the gap between wholesale price and marginal cost can be decomposed into three
components. One corresponds to the strategic “rent-shifting” eﬀect identiﬁed by Marx and
Shaﬀer (1999). A second one corresponds to the “reducing its own cost” strategy identiﬁed
when bilateral bargaining are simultaneous. Both work in the same direction, that is below
marginal cost pricing as a rule in case of substitutes.
However, there is a third eﬀect which works in the opposite direction. Indeed, in sequential
bargaining, the joint proﬁt of the retailer and the ﬁrst manufacturer takes into account the
surplus extracted from the relationship between the retailer and the second manufacturer.
This provides the retailer with incentives to partially internalize the negative externality
of the quantity exchanged with the ﬁrst supplier on this surplus. This consideration tends
to produce above marginal cost pricing as long as the retailer retains some surplus in its
negotiation with the second manufacturer. For instance, if products are independent and if
the second manufacturer has no bargaining power then above marginal cost pricing is the
rule. On the contrary, if the retailer has no bargaining power within its relationship with the
second manufacturer, then below marginal cost pricing is the rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted ﬁrst to assumptions and notations
and second to establish the proﬁt sharing in bargaining equilibria. Section 3 is devoted to
the analysis of optimal two-parts tariﬀs in simultaneous bargaining. Section 4 provides the
5welfare analysis. In section 5, we analyze the negotiations when they occur sequentially.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions and notations
Consider a channel structure in which an upstream producer sector sells a (homogenous)
raw product to a processing industry composed of n ≥ 2 manufacturers, denoted Mi, ∀i =
1,...,n. The manufacturers subsequently process and sell a ﬁnal diﬀerentiated commodity to
a downstream retailer R acting as a monopoly. We assume a perfectly competitive upstream
sector while market power is present at both the manufacturers’ level and retail level. Thus,
manufacturers act both as an oligopsony when buying raw material and as an oligopoly when
selling their products to the retailer. Similarly, the retailer acts both as a monopsony when
negotiating with manufacturers and as a monopoly with respect to ﬁnal consumers.
Upstream producers sell a quantity xi of the raw product to any manufacturer Mi, ∀i =
1,...,n,a tap r i c epx given by the inverse supply function px = Px(
P
i
xi),w h e r eP0
x > 0.E a c h
manufacturer Mi produces a single product qi given the processing technology qi = fi(xi)
with f0
i(xi) > 0, ∀i =1 ,...,n.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,w ed e ﬁne Ci(q) as the cost function for Mi,w h e r e











Obviously, given our assumption on Px, upstream competition for raw material entails nega-
tive externalities between manufacturers because each production cost is increasing in other
manufacturers’ purchases (∂Ci(q)/∂qj = xiP0
x/f0
j(xj) > 0, ∀i 6= j). The quantity qi is sold
to the retail monopolist R in exchange of a monetary transfer Ti. Then manufacturer Mi’s
proﬁti sπi = Ti − Px(
P
i
xi)xi or equivalently πi = Ti − Ci(q).
Let R(q) denote the revenue function of the retail monopolist.2 Then the retailer’s proﬁt
2Alternatively, the retailer may be the ﬁnal consumer and R(q) can be interpreted as the indirect utility
from consuming the bundle q.
6is πR = R(q)−
P
i
Ti if the retailer has an agreement with each manufacturer. For simplicity,
we assume that the retailer does not face any distribution cost and if Pi(q) denotes the retail





Throughout the analysis, we make the following assumptions:
A1:R(q) is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable and concave,
A2:Ci(q) is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable and convex, ∀i =1 ,...,n,
A3:There are gains from trading all goods, i.e. ∃q ∈<n




In particular, assumption A3 ensures that we can consider equilibria where all products are
sold. In addition, we assume that manufacturers are precluded from entering the downstream
market so that each manufacturer has to induce the retailer to carry its product in order to
obtain positive proﬁts. Thus, the monopoly advantage for the retailer implies that any
manufacturer’s proﬁt is non positive if it does not reach an agreement with the retailer (it
can be negative if the relationship with the retailer entails speciﬁc investment costs before
entering into negotiations).
2.2 Negotiating contracts
We consider the following two-stages game between n manufacturers and their common re-
tailer. In the ﬁrst stage, the retailer negotiates a contract Ti(qi) simultaneously with each
manufacturer. In the second stage, the retailer chooses how much to buy of each product
qi and order these quantities from manufacturers. Then, manufacturers compete to buy the
raw product from the upstream sector and process the goods. Finally, the retailer resells
these quantities to ﬁnal consumers, exerting its monopoly power. We are only interested in
considering equilibria where all products are sold through the retailer.
As emphasized by Marx and Shaﬀer (1999) and Shaﬀer (2001), the main diﬃculty comes
from the linkage across negotiations which raises arduous questions. In particular, what
7does each manufacturer know about their rivals’ contract terms? Indeed, when negotiating,
each manufacturer must conjecture the set of terms its rivals have or have been oﬀered. In
equilibrium, this conjecture must be correct but out-of-equilibrium beliefs may be important
in determining the bargaining outcome. In the cooperative bargaining approach, this problem
is resolved by assuming that any bargaining outcome must be bilaterally renegotiation proof,
i.e. no processor-retailer can deviate from the bargaining outcome in a way that increases
their joint proﬁt, taking as given all other contracts. Following Marx and Shaﬀer (1999) and
Shaﬀer (2001), we thus assume that bargaining between the retailer and any manufacturer
Mi maximizes the two players’ joint proﬁt, taking as given all other negotiated contracts.
Moreover, we assume that each player earns its disagreement payoﬀ ( i . e .w h a ti tw o u l de a r n
if an agreement is not reached) plus a share of the incremental gains from trade, deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the joint proﬁt of the retailer and Mi when they trade and their joint
proﬁtw h e nt h e yd on o tt r a d e ) ,w i t hp r o p o r t i o nλi ∈ [0,1] going to manufacturer Mi.
In fact, it can be proven that the asymmetric Nash product, which is maximized by the
Nash bargaining solution, is maximized if and only if the above assumptions are satisﬁed
(see Proposition 2 in Shaﬀer (2001)). However, it can easily be shown that the equilibrium
contract is not unique. We thus focus in the following on the particular case of two-parts
tariﬀs.
3 Simultaneous bargaining with two-parts tariﬀs
In order to provide a precise characterization of bargaining equilibria, we specialize the model
by restricting the set of possible contracts to the set of two-parts tariﬀs. Denote Ti(qi) the
agreement reached by the retailer with manufacturer Mi, ∀i =1 ,...,n. Ti is deﬁned as the
net payment from the retailer to manufacturer Mi:
Ti(qi)=
½
wiqi − Fi,q i > 0
0,q i =0
,∀i =1 ...n.
8where Fi, is a fee or slotting allowance paid by Mi to the retailer, in order to access to the
ﬁnal demand. Of course, the sign of the fee Fi is not restricted ap r i o r iin the analysis.







[(Pi(q) − wi)qi + Fi].
where Pi(q) is the (ﬁnal) inverse demand function for product i. If manufacturer Mi sells a
positive quantity, his proﬁti s:
πi = wiqi − Ci(q) − Fi = Ti − Ci(q),∀i. (1)
As emphasized in the preceding section, we assume that bargaining between the retailer and
each manufacturer Mi results in the maximization of the two players’ joint proﬁt denoted Πi,








Then, each manufacturer earns a share of the incremental gains from trade, that is the
joint proﬁt with the retailer and manufacturer Mi when they trade minus their joint proﬁt
when they do not trade, with an exogenous proportion λi ∈ [0,1] g o i n gt om a n u f a c t u r e rMi.
The proportion λi measures the bargaining power of Mi.Av a l u eo fλi close to one means
a large bargaining power and a value close to zero means that the manufacturer has low
bargaining power.
Denote T−i as the set of all contracts except for manufacturer Mi,i . e .T−i = {T1,...,T n}\{Ti}.






where q−i =( q1,..q i−1,0,q i+1,...q n) is the vector of production when Mi does not sell through
the retailer.
In the second stage, the retailer takes the contracts Ti with each manufacturer as given
and conditional on the bargaining outcome he chooses q that maximizes his proﬁtg i v e nt h e
9wholesale prices vector w. We denote the equilibrium quantities qi(w), ∀i when the retailer
contracts with all manufacturers. Then:





[(Pi(q) − wi)qi + Fi]. (2)
As the retailer is a monopolist, the retail equilibrium quantities deﬁned by program (2) are
given by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:






If an agreement does not occur with manufacturer i because negotiation fails in the ﬁrst
stage, then the retailer chooses:






[(Pj(q−i) − wj)qj + Fj],.
and we denote ˆ πR




[(Pj(ˆ q−i(w))ˆ qj(w) − Cj(ˆ q−i(w))]
as the joint proﬁt of all players (for a given w)w h e nMi does not participate.
In the ﬁrst stage (bargaining game), negotiations occur between the retailer and each
manufacturer simultaneously. When negotiating with Mi, the retailer and Mi take Tj ∀j 6= i
as given. The equilibrium wholesale price is given by the maximization of the joint proﬁt:
max
wi
Πi = Pi(q(w))qi(w) − Ci(q(w)) +
X
j6=i
[(Pj(q(w)) − wj)qj(w)+Fj]. (4)
Solving this maximization program, we state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a simultaneous bilateral bargaining equilibrium with two-parts tariﬀs, whole-

















¯ ¯ ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, if products are imperfect substitutes
(complements), then wholesale price is below (above) marginal cost (wi − ∂Ci
∂qi < (>)0,∀i).




































































































Simplifying this expression, we get the result. Furthermore, we have
∂qi
∂wi < 0.M o r e o v e r ,
if commodities are imperfect substitutes (complements), then
∂qj
∂wi > (<)0 and γji < (>)0.
Finally, because of the Cournot competition setting in the upstream sector, ∂Ci
∂qj > 0,w eg e ta
negative (positive) gap between wholesale price and marginal cost if products are substitutes
(complements).
Proposition 1 indicates that the equilibrium wholesale pricing diﬀers from the marginal
cost of production because of the presence of externalities both at the upstream and down-
stream levels. In the important case of substitutes, below marginal cost pricing occurs at the
equilibrium. Without cost externalities (i.e. when ∂Ci/∂qj =0 ,∀j 6= i), proposition 1 also
states that marginal cost pricing prevails as in Shaﬀer’s (2001) model. In presence of cost
externalities and imperfect substitutes, each negotiated contract takes partially into account
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of the quantities sold by the rival manufacturers’ on the procurement cost.
Indeed, decreasing the wholesale price amounts to decrease the rivals’ quantities sold by the
retailer, which in turn lowers its own procurement cost by reducing cost externalities. Thus,





∂qj ) is lower than marginal cost. This strate-
gic eﬀect is more compelling when ﬁnal products are less diﬀerentiated, ceteris paribus.O n
the contrary, in the particular case where ﬁnal demands for both products are independent
(i.e. ∂qj/∂wi =0 ,∀j 6= i), cost externalities are irrelevant for the wholesale pricing rule and
11marginal cost pricing occurs.
Proposition 1 does not allow to state that operating proﬁts (i.e. excluding the fee or
slotting allowance Fi) for manufacturers are positive in the case of imperfect substitutes (i.e.
when γji < 0). In theory, it may be the case that the distortions due to cost externalities are so
strong that wholesale prices are below average cost for some manufacturers. Indeed, assuming
symmetry in cost and demand functions, it is possible to prove that a necessary and suﬃcient
condition to have below average cost pricing at the equilibrium is that 1+
P
j6=i γji < 0,w h i c h
means that ﬁnal commodities are few diﬀerentiated ceteris paribus (see Appendix A).
We now show that the presence of externalities does not allow to maximize overall joint
proﬁt.
Proposition 2 In a simultaneous bilateral bargaining equilibrium with two-parts tariﬀs, joint
proﬁt of all manufacturers and the retailer is not maximized.
Proof: Maximizing the proﬁt ΠIVS =
P
i [Pi(q)qi − Ci(q)] of the corresponding inte-













In the non integrated vertical structure, the retailer maximization program implies the fol-
lowing ﬁrst-order condition (see (3)):





qj =0 ,∀i. (7)















Comparing expressions (6) and (8), we obtain that the non integrated vertical structure
















12Even assuming symmetry of the cost functions (i.e. ∂Ci
∂qj =
∂Cj





because products are imperfect substitutes.
Thus, the externality induced by the upstream competition induces an eﬃciency loss in
the vertical structure that depends on the ﬁnal demand assumptions and on the intensity
of upstream competition. Indeed, a way to implement the optimum for an integrated (both





as indicated by (6). This result indicates that the perceived marginal cost is then the sum
of all marginal eﬀects of quantity qi on all manufacturers’ costs and thereby all upstream
externalities are internalized at the equilibrium. By contrast, in the non integrated vertical
structure, only the negative externalities of others’ quantities on its own cost are partially
taken into account in each bilateral bargaining.
Finally, the fee Fi is chosen to divide the incremental gains from trade so that each party
e a r n sa sp r o ﬁt as it would earn if negotiations have failed. Let Π−i denote the equilibrium
joint proﬁt of all players when Mi does not participate and let Π denote the equilibrium joint








where q = q(w) and ˆ q−i = ˆ q−i(w). Then, the following proposition states the equilibrium
fees and payoﬀs to the retailer and to the manufacturers.
Proposition 3 In a simultaneous bilateral bargaining equilibrium with two-parts tariﬀs, the
equilibrium payoﬀ to manufacturer Mi, for any i,i s :
πi = λi [Π − Π−i − ∆−i]

















j6=i [wjqj − Cj(q)] −
P
j6=i [wjˆ qj − Cj(ˆ q−i)].
13Proof: Given that the disagreement payoﬀ of any manufacturer is zero because there is
only one retailer (actually what is really important is that these payoﬀsm u s tb ec o n s t a n t ) ,
we can express the equilibrium payoﬀ for manufacturer Mi as follows:
πi = λi
£










[(Pj(q) − wj)qj + Fj] −
X
j6=i








[(Pj(q) − wj)qj − Cj(q)+Cj(q)] −
X
j6=i








[Cj(q) − wjqj] −
X
j6=i






Π − Π−i +
X
j6=i
[Cj(q) − wjqj] −
X
j6=i
[Cj(ˆ q−i) − wjˆ qj]

.
Consequently, the equilibrium proﬁt for the retailer is:























[Cj(q) − wjqj] −
X
j6=i
[Cj(ˆ q−i) − wjˆ qj]

.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3 indicates that the equilibrium payoﬀ of any manufacturer is proportional
to the incremental gain of its product (Π − Π−i) diminished by a scale eﬀect ∆−i.W h e n




[wjqj − Cj(q)] −
X
j6=i





Cj(q) − Cj(ˆ q−i)
qj − ˆ qj
− wj
¶
(qj − ˆ qj)
¸
14Similarly, we can decompose the equilibrium payoﬀ of the retailer πR into three compo-
nents. The ﬁrst one is proportional to joint proﬁta n dc a nb en e g a t i v ei ft h em a n u f a c t u r e r s
possess a suﬃciently high bargaining power (
P
i λi > 1). The second one is a weighted sum
of joint proﬁt when one manufacturer does not participate (
P
i
λiΠ−i). Finally, the third one




Finally, using the deﬁnition of Mi’s proﬁt and result from Proposition 3 gives the equi-







qi − λi [Π − Π−i − ∆−i].
We have λi [Π − Π−i − ∆−i] ≥ 0 by deﬁnition (equilibrium payoﬀ for Mi). Moreover, the
sign of the ﬁrst term between brackets is positive as long as the wholesale price is higher
than average cost at the equilibrium output level. Overall, the sign of Fi is undetermined
and depends on the magnitude of the margin. When the retailer has all the bargaining power
(λi =0 ), then Fi > 0 if wholesale price is between marginal cost and average cost.
4W e l f a r e
In the previous section, we have shown that the equilibrium contracts imply below marginal
cost pricing (hereafter BMCP) but that this does not mean that some manufacturers are
driven out of the market. Because this practice is often considered as injury to competition,
we analyze in this section whether below marginal cost pricing is welfare reducing compared
to pricing at marginal cost (hereafter MCP). We deﬁne welfare as the non weighted sum of
the surplus of the raw product producers (PS), of the industry channel (IS) (that is the
manufacturers and the retailer) and of consumers (CS).



























0 Pi(u,q−i)du the utility of a representative consumer buying quantities
qi of each commodity. Then, the equilibrium consumer surplus is:




Finally, the total equilibrium welfare reduces to:







Intuitively, we conjecture that BMCP may often induce a rise in quantities sold at the
equilibrium, and is thereby beneﬁcial for consumers but also for the raw product producers.
On the other hand, this increase in quantities may be detrimental for the industry surplus.
Overall, the total eﬀect is unclear. We thus specialize the model and we state the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that n =2 . Consider (symmetric) linear demand functions, Pi(qi,q j)=
α − qi − νqj where 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 as well as a linear supply function Px = δ + φ(xi + xj). In
addition, consider a Leontieﬀ (constant return to scale) technology where qi = kxi.T h e n ,
below marginal cost pricing is always welfare improving compared to marginal cost pricing.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Intuitively, the pro-competitive eﬀect of below marginal cost pricing overcomes the loss
in industry surplus. In Table 1, we simulate the impact on welfare for given values of the
demand and supply parameters (α =1 , ν =0 .5, δ =1 , φ =2and k =3 ).
TABLE 1: Comparisons between below-cost pricing, marginal cost pricing and integrated
vertical structure
MCP BMCP∗ IVSP∗
PS 0.0147 +6.35% -11.10%
IS 0.1139 -0.51% +0.36%
CS 0.0330 +8.16% -11.10%
W 0.1616 +1.5% -3.02%
(wi − ∂Ci
∂qi )/∂Ci
∂qi 0.00%∗ -4.54%∗∗ +8.51%∗∗
Average cost 0.4141 +0.61% -1.11%
wi 0.4545 -3.74% +6.86%
Pi 0.7273 -1.18% +2.13%
16∗: These values are in percentage of MCP. ∗∗: These percentages indicate the value of ratios.
Below marginal cost pricing amounts to higher quantities sold on the ﬁnal market. Final
prices decrease by 1.18%. This beneﬁts to consumers. On the other hand, these additional
quantities induce a larger use of raw product that raises its price. Consequently, the surplus of
raw product producers increases. However, the manufacturers and the retailer would jointly
beneﬁt from committing to marginal cost pricing. Indeed, strategic interactions at work leads
each manufacturer to overproduce in order to reduce rival’s quantity, which in turn lowers
the procurement cost. This strategic eﬀect induces losses in industry surplus (IS).
Now, in the benchmark case of integrated vertical structure pricing (IVSP), Table 1
indicates that above marginal cost pricing occurs as it is clear from Proposition 2 and leads
to improvement in industry surplus. Actually, quantities decreases as a consequence of high
wholesale prices. This in turns reduces both producer and consumer surplus. Overall, welfare
decreases because the gain in industry surplus does not compensate the loss for upstream
producers and consumers.
It is also interesting to analyze the impact of commodity substitutability on our results.
We present the case where the degree of diﬀerentiation between the two products is increased.
The demand functions are now: Pi(qi,q j)=1− 0.75qi − 0.25qj.3
TABLE 2: Impact of commodity substitutability on welfare.
MCP BMCP∗ IVSP∗
PS 0.0278 +5.80% -14.8%
IS 0.1528 -0.65% +0.65%
CS 0.0469 +5.76% -14.9%
W 0.2274 +1.49% -4.35%
(wi − ∂Ci
∂qi )/∂Ci
∂qi 0.00%* -3.92%∗∗ +10.53%∗∗
Average cost 0.4444 +0.72% -1.69%
wi 0.5 -2.86% +7.7%
Pi 0.75 -0.95% +2.56%
∗: These values are in percentage of MCP. ∗∗: These percentages indicate the value of ratios.
3It is worth noting that a change only in ν induces also a change in total demand and can yield to unwanted
results, as emphasized by Irmen (1997). This is why we choose to decrease the coeﬃcient of both qi and qj
as indicated in the text. Actually, this is equivalent to divide by 2 the cross-price sensitivity (i.e. coeﬃcient b
in: qi = a − dpi + b(pj − pi)). For more on this, see Irmen (1997).
17A decrease in the substitutability of the product tends to increase welfare (40% in the
considered example). However, the gain in welfare due to BMCP is slightly reduced when
products are less substitute. Intuitively, when products are more diﬀerentiated, the impact
of externalities on the wholesale pricing rule is reduced ceteris paribus (see equation (5)).
The pro-competitive eﬀect of below marginal cost pricing is thus attenuated.
5 Sequential bargaining
This section is devoted to the analysis of sequential negotiations between manufacturers and
the retailer. Following Marx and Shaﬀer (1999), we restrict for simplicity the study to the
case of two manufacturers of imperfect substitutes. We let manufacturer M1 be the ﬁrst
supplier to negotiate with the retailer. The game has now three stages. In stage one, the
retailer negotiates a contract T1 with M1 for the purchase of q1. In stage two, the retailer
negotiates a contract T2 with M2 for the purchase of q2. In stage three, the retailer chooses
quantities q1 and q2 to purchase and resells them in the ﬁnal goods market. We thus solve for
the equilibrium strategies of the retailer and manufacturers using backward induction. Our
solution concept is subgame perfection.
In stage three, the retailer takes as given the contracts with the two manufacturers as
in the case of simultaneous bargaining (section 3), and chooses q1 and q2 as stated in (2),
whenever an agreement is reached with both suppliers:
max
q1,q2
πR = R(q1,q 2) −
2 X
i=1
(wiqi − Fi). (10)
Denote q∗
1 and q∗
2 the maximizers in (10), which are assumed to be uniquely deﬁned.
In stage two, the manufacturer M2 and the retailer negotiates a contract T2,t a k i n ga s






















−2 = R(0,q 1) − w1q1 + F1.
which maximizer is denoted ˆ q1.
Overall, both players divide the gains from trade so that each receives its disagreement
payoﬀ plus a share of the incremental gains, with proportion λ2 accruing to M2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the optimal fee F∗


















−2 = R(ˆ q1,0) − T1(ˆ q1).
In stage one, the manufacturer M1 and the retailer negotiates a contract T1,t a k i n g
as given the equilibrium strategies in stage two and three. The optimal two-parts tariﬀ












































1 + F1 − R(ˆ q1,0) + w1ˆ q1 − F1].
Rearranging terms, we obtain the following expression for joint proﬁt:







1 − ˆ q1)+λ2R(ˆ q1,0). (12)
This allows us to state the following proposition, assuming that the production of both
products is eﬃcient (from the viewpoint of the integrated vertical structure).
19Proposition 5 At the equilibrium with sequential bilateral negotiations, the wholesale price





















∂wi and η = γ21γ12.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to w1, we get:
∂Π1
∂w1






















































































1 − ˆ q1)=0 .
using the result concerning the optimal wholesale price w2. Further manipulations yields to
the result.
As indicated by Proposition 5, the gap between wholesale price and marginal cost can be
decomposed into three terms. The last one (−λ2/
∂q1
∂w1)(q∗
1 − ˆ q1)) corresponds to the strategic
eﬀect identiﬁed by Marx and Shaﬀer (1999). This term is non positive when products are
imperfect substitutes because q∗
1 < ˆ q1. Intuitively, given the common procurement cost w1,
the quantity q∗
1 sold when the substitute is also on the market is lower than the quantity
ˆ q1 sold when the other product is not on the shelf. As suggested by Marx and Shaﬀer, a
lower wholesale price has two sub-eﬀects. On one hand, it allows to increase the retailer’s
disagreement payoﬀ in proportion to ˆ q1 at the margin. This provides the retailer with an
incentive for below marginal cost pricing with M1. On the other hand, a lower wholesale
price also increases the retailer’s joint proﬁt with manufacturer M2 (in proportion to q∗
1 at
the margin), giving the retailer a weaker bargaining position in its negotiations with M2.
This provides the retailer with an incentive for above marginal cost pricing with M1.A sl o n g
20as there are surplus to extract from M2 i.e. λ2 > 0 then the ﬁrst consideration dominates
the second one.
The second term (γ21
∂C1
∂q2 ) corresponds to the “reducing its own cost” strategy identiﬁed
in Proposition 1 when bilateral bargaining are simultaneous. Both the ﬁr s ta n dt h es e c o n d
terms work in the same direction, that is below marginal cost pricing as a rule in case of
substitutes.
However, there is the ﬁrst term ((1 − λ2)(1 − η)∂C2
∂q1 ) which is non negative because
¯ ¯γji
¯ ¯ < 1 and thus 1 − η>0, ∂C2
∂q1 > 0 and 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1. As indicated by (12), the joint proﬁt
of the retailer and M1 takes into account the incremental gain coming from the relationship
between the retailer and the second manufacturer M2 (i.e. (1 − λ2)(R − C2)). This provides
the retailer with incentives to partially internalize the negative externality of the quantity
exchanged q∗
1 on this surplus and in particular the cost C2 of the second manufacturer. This
consideration tends to above marginal cost pricing as long as the retailer retains some surplus
in its negotiation with M2 (λ2 < 1).
Overall, Proposition 5 indicates that wholesale price may be or not under marginal cost,
contrary to the case under simultaneous bilateral bargaining (see Proposition 1). For example,
if products are independent (i.e. η = γ21 =0 ) and if manufacturer M2 has no bargaining
power (λ2 =0 ) then only the ﬁrst positive term remains and above marginal cost pricing is
the rule. On the contrary, if the retailer has no bargaining power within its relationship with
the second manufacturer (λ2 =1 ), then the ﬁrst term disappears and below marginal cost
pricing is the rule.
Finally, once again, both players divide the incremental gains from trade so that each
receives its disagreement payoﬀ plus a share of the gains, with proportion λ1 accruing to M1.
Consequently, the optimal fee F∗

















−1 =( 1 − λ2)(R(0, ˆ q2) − C2(0, ˆ q2)) and where ˆ q2 is the maximizer of R(0,q 2) −
21C2(0,q 2).
6C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper has been to analyze vertical contracts between manufacturers and
retailers in a channel including the upstream input market. Using a Nash bargaining frame-
work, we have studied the contract negotiations between manufacturers and the common
retailer, both in a simultaneous and sequential game. The oligopsonistic behavior of manu-
facturers on the upstream market provides a new explanation for predatory accommodation.
With two-parts tariﬀ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tj o i n tp r o ﬁt of the industry is not maximised at
simultaneous bilateral bargaining equilibria and that below marginal cost pricing in the in-
termediate goods market arises, when ﬁnal products are substitutes, and may be welfare
improving. When negotiations occurs sequentially, we have shown, in the two-manufacturers
case, that the ﬁrst manufacturer which enters into negotiations and the retailer may jointly
prefer above marginal cost pricing or not, depending on the distribution of bargaining power
in the channel. However, the second manufacturer equilibrium wholesale price is set below
marginal cost.
Further research will be devoted to analyse the optimal order of negotiations in the se-
quential case. Also, in both sequential and simultaneous bargaining, it is important to extend
these results by considering more general form of contract (non linear with discount, mar-
ket share contracts). Finally, in a companion paper (Bontems and Bouamra-Mechemache,
2003), we perform comparative statics related to shocks on raw product supply and ﬁnal
demand. We show how these shocks aﬀect pricing, prices transmission along the channel,
surplus sharing in the channel and welfare.
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24Appendix
A Below average cost pricing



































































































Because fi is concave, we have
fi(xi)
xif0



















and the conclusion follows.
B BMCP is welfare improving
Using the speciﬁcation in the text, we obtain at the optimum, after straightforward but
cumbersome computations, the following expressions:
PS=
2φ(δ − kα)2
[φ(ν − 3) − 2k2(1 + ν)] 2
25IS =
2(δ − kα)2(k2(1 + ν)+φ − νφ)
[φ(ν − 3) − 2k2(1 + ν)] 2
CS =
k2(δ − kα)2
[φ(ν − 3) − 2k2(1 + ν)] 2
and consequently,
WBMCP =
(δ − kα)2 £
k2(3 + 2ν)+2 φ(2 − ν)
¤
[φ(3 − ν)+2 k2(1 + ν)] 2 > 0
When marginal cost pricing is imposed, we obtain the following expression for welfare:
WMCP =
(δ − kα)2 £
k2(3 + 2ν)+4 φ
¤
[3φ +2 k2(1 + ν)] 2 > 0
Note that when φ =0 ,t h e nWBMCP = WMCP > 0. Denote Γ = k2(3 + 2ν)+2 φ(2 − ν)
and ∆ = φ(3 − ν)+2 k2(1 + ν).T h u s , WBMCP =( δ − kα)2Γ/∆2. Similarly, denote
Ψ = k2(3 + 2ν)+4 φ and Ω =3 φ +2 k2(1 + ν) so that WMCP =( δ − kα)2Ψ/Ω2.W eh a v e
Ω = ∆ + νφ and Γ = Ψ − 2νφ. Then, we obtain:






















Γν2φ2 +2 νφ∆(k2 +( 1− ν)φ)
¤
≥ 0
with equality for φ =0 , which states the conclusion.
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